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Provincial Autonomy: The Territorial 
Dimension of Peace in Mozambique
Natália Bueno, Johannes Plagemann, and Julia Strasheim
A year after the 2014 national elections Mozambican security forces began increasing 
the pressure on Renamo, the main opposition party and former guerrilla movement, 
to disarm. Following several attacks on his entourage since September, Renamo lead-
er Afonso Dhlakama has gone into hiding. On 19 November the Mozambican president 
and leader of the ruling Frelimo party, Filipe Nyusi, called for “restraint” in disarm-
ing Renamo – thereby exposing an unusual degree of friction between the more radical 
wing and the moderates within Frelimo.
Analysis
The resurgence of violent conflict in Mozambique in 2013/14 raised new doubts about 
the country’s peace and democratisation process. After a strong showing at the 2014 
national elections, Renamo began demanding autonomy for those provinces in which it 
won majorities. The governing Frelimo party has rejected these demands. 
  Renamo presidential candidate and former civil war combatant Afonso Dhlakama 
won 37 against Filipe Nyusi’s 57 per cent of the popular vote – to the surprise of ma-
ny and amid allegations of fraud. Governing Frelimo have since been in negotiations 
with Renamo but have rejected calls for Renamo’s participation in government.
  Since Filipe Nyusi took presidential office in January 2015, Renamo has repeatedly 
called for subnational autonomy in six provinces with significant opposition support. 
  Although Mozambican provinces are administered by centrally nominated gover-
nors, direct elections in 53 mostly urban municipalities allow for some degree of sub-
national autonomy. A donor-funded decentralisation process since the late 1990s has 
also contributed to both the deconcentration of power and some devolution.
  Comparative research on territorial autonomy arrangements suggests that such 
pacts can be a tool for sustainable peace, but that territorial deals should be embed-
ded in broader institutional reforms in order to be a viable solution to conflict. 
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Mozambique since 2013: Peace Unravels
Fifteen months after the 2014 peace accord that 
ended a 16-months military uprising in Mozam-
bique, the country appears to once again be on the 
brink of violent conflict. The current political crisis 
started after the 2014 general election. As in past 
elections, the victory of the incumbent Mozam-
bique Liberation Front (Frelimo) was overshad-
owed by allegations of electoral fraud, the misuse 
of state resources, a lack of transparency, and an 
“uneven playing field.” The Mozambican Nation-
al Resistance (Renamo), the main opposition par-
ty and former guerrilla movement, immediate-
ly rejected the results despite its own unexpected 
strong showing. Afonso Dhlakama, the long-time 
leader of Renamo, has constantly made reference 
to the use of force as a last resort to achieve Rena-
mo’s political goals, which has fuelled fears of civ-
il war in Mozambique. Recently, Dhlakama asked, 
“Has Frelimo ever accepted to approve anything 
without being beaten?”1 
Prior to the 2014 elections, Mozambique had 
experienced almost two years of military confron-
tation because of a disagreement between Freli-
mo and Renamo over electoral legislation, the dis-
armament of Renamo, the integration of Renamo 
forces into the Mozambican army, and the “de-
politicisation” (despartidarização) of the state. De-
politicisation aims at reducing Frelimo’s long-
standing hold on the state and the ongoing con-
vergence of state and party matters. Frelimo had 
previously passed new legislation not only lim-
iting opposition parties’ participation in nation-
al and provincial elections but also reducing their 
capacity to contest elections in most constituen-
cies (Manning 2010). In response, Renamo de-
manded further reforms of the electoral system, 
including changes to the National Elections Com-
mission (CNE), which had purportedly manipu-
lated past electoral processes in favour of Frelimo.
Following an attack on Renamo’s military base 
in Satunjira by national force in October 2013, 
Dhlakama declared the suspension of the Rome 
General Peace Accord. Renamo retaliation was 
limited mostly to the central provinces, but their 
impact on Mozambican society was severe. Be-
sides numerous casualties, they contributed to the 
destruction of Mozambique’s infrastructure and 
1 Savana weekly newspaper, printed edition, Maputo, 26 June 
2015. 
caused significant economic losses, including the 
suspension of foreign direct investment. Conse-
quently, memories of Mozambique’s brutal civil 
war resurged and old fears were resurrected.
On 5 September 2014 former president Arman-
do Guebuza and Dhlakama signed the Accord on 
Cessation of Hostilities and thus brought mili-
tary hostilities to a halt. The signature of the new 
peace agreement represented renewed hope, and 
allowed for both parties to focus their efforts on 
contesting the upcoming general election in Oc-
tober 2014. However, the agreement did little to 
ease the political tensions between the two par-
ties. Even though Renamo voters attended the 
polls in great numbers, voter turnout was still low 
when compared to the 1990s – only 51 per cent 
of all eligible voters. The main presidential candi-
dates were Filipe Jacinto Nyusi (Frelimo), Afonso 
Dhlakama (Renamo), and David Simango (Demo-
cratic Movement of Mozambique, MDM). Frelimo 
once again prevailed, with Nyusi securing 57 per 
cent of the vote.
The new leader himself and his transition to 
power have also caused uncertainty in Mozam-
bique. Nyusi is native of Mueda Cabo Delgado, 
the country’s northernmost province and home 
to the Makonde people, who fought for libera-
tion against Portugal. The Makonde represent a 
strong interest group in the Ministry of Defence 
and greatly influenced Nyusi’s selection as a pres-
idential candidate. Compared with previous Mo-
zambican presidents, Nyusi has had a very short 
political career. He spent a great part of his profes-
sional life in the business sector and only entered 
politics in 2008, when he was nominated minister 
of defence by then president Armando Guebuza. 
Although Guebuza concluded his term in office in 
line with the constitutional two-term limit, he ini-
tially remained Frelimo party leader. This raised 
doubts about his commitment to the democratic 
process because, historically, presidents have al-
ways occupied both posts. Guebuza’s resigna-
tion as party leader three months after Nyusi was 
sworn in as president exposed Frelimo’s inter-
nal friction. According to the newspaper Savana,2 
even before Nyusi’s inauguration, Guebuza had 
declared his intention to hold on to the Frelimo 
leadership to the dismay of other leading Frelimo 
figures, such as Alberto Chipande.3 This reveals 
2 Savana weekly newspaper, printed edition, Maputo, 30 Janu-
ary 2015.
3 Alberto Chipande is a senior member of Frelimo, Maconde, 
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that it will be a big challenge for Nyusi to con-
solidate power inside Frelimo, particularly over 
the remaining guebuzistas, who have adopted a 
radical position towards Renamo’s claims. In the 
words of former foreign affairs minister, Leonar-
do Simão, “poor communication and strong hos-
tility characterised the relationship between Gue-
buza’s government and Renamo.”4 Under such 
conditions, the emphasis Nyusi placed on equal-
ity and political inclusion in his inaugural speech, 
as well as his reiteration of his availability to meet 
with Dhlakama, indicated a renewed willingness 
to negotiate.
Nevertheless, the reality on the ground differs 
considerably from the rhetoric and declarations. 
The most recent outbreaks of violence have seen 
an already unstable situation further deteriorate, 
raising concerns about whether Nyusi will be able 
to maintain peace in the country and keep the gue-
buzistas at bay. A first violent incident occurred on 
12 September 2015, when Dhlakama’s motorcade 
was met with gunshots in Macossa, Manica prov-
ince. Dhlakama claimed that he was the victim of 
a Frelimo plot, while Frelimo accused Renamo of 
staging the attack. The episode remains unclear, 
and no conclusive investigation has been carried 
out – though several news reports confirm a ma-
jor battle lasting hours took place and left dozens 
dead on both sides. According to Professor Lou-
renço Joaquim da Costa do Rosário, rector of the 
Universidade Politécnica and a mediator in talks 
between the government and Renamo, some with-
in Frelimo sought to assassinate Dhlakama be-
fore integrating the remaining Renamo forces in-
to the army (Africa Confidential 2015: 5). After an-
other attack on Dhlakama’s entourage in Amaton-
gas, Manica province, on 25 September, Dhlaka-
ma returned to the bush for the first time since last 
year’s elections. Not even one day after his pub-
lic reappearance and return to Beira, the capital 
of Sofala province, Dhalakama’s house was raided 
and his personal guard disarmed. After 10 hours 
of turmoil the Renamo leader finally agreed to 
hand over his personal guard’s arms to a group 
of mediators – an unusual concession from a par-
ty leader whose bargaining power has always pri-
marily consisted of the threat of violence.
and uncle of President Filipe Nyusi.
4 The interview was conducted by Natália Bueno in Maputo, 
August 2015. 
The Recent Call for Territorial Autonomy
As soon as the general election results were an-
nounced, Renamo declared it did not recognise 
their validity. They alleged that nearly one million 
votes had been rigged in favour of Frelimo. To 
remedy the situation, Dhlakama at first proposed 
the creation of a transitory government composed 
of technocrats to rule the country until the next 
elections in 2019. Soon, however, Dhlakama aban-
doned the idea and instead began demanding 
greater autonomy for the six provinces in which 
he claimed to have won a majority – Nampula, Ni-
assa, Tete, Zambezia, Sofala, and Manica. 
Dhlakama’s demands were codified in a bill 
that envisaged the establishment of autonomous 
provinces represented by Renamo in the Mozam-
bican Parliament. The bill called for the immediate 
creation of the six aforementioned autonomous 
provinces, the nomination of provincial coun-
cil presidents (presidentes de conselhos provinciais) 
according to which presidential candidate won 
the most votes in each provinces, and the trans-
fer of 50 per cent of all revenues generated by re-
source extraction to the new autonomous provinc-
es. However, on 30 April 2015 Frelimo shot down 
(chumbou) the proposal based on Article 271 of 
the Constitution of Mozambique, which states the 
objectives of local administration in the country. 
One senior Mozambican journalist, Tomás Vieira 
Mário, commented, “Once again, the latest elec-
tions, held in October, appear not as a fundamen-
tal right for every citizen, but as a curse for our 
Nation!”5
From 9 June to 12 June the National Council of 
Renamo convened in Beira. Despite Dhlakama’s 
threats, the council decided against the immedi-
ate use of force and instead insisted on resum-
ing negotiations with the government. The situa-
tion, however, has remained uncertain ever since. 
Notwithstanding the significant economic growth 
during the last decades, dissatisfaction with the 
ruling party is widespread, and inequality is ris-
ing – both of which have arguably contributed to 
social unrest. On top of this, attempts to integrate 
former Renamo fighters into the nation’s security 
forces have failed and Frelimo membership con-
tinues to be essential for professional advance-
ment in many businesses and the bureaucracy. 
5 Savana weekly newspaper, printed edition, Maputo, 19 June 
2015.
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The resulting feeling of exclusion and marginali-
sation unites Renamo’s lower level ex-combatants 
and higher ranks.6 This begs the following ques-
tion: Can provincial autonomy serve as a lasting 
solution to the political conflict in Mozambique 
given its history of decentralisation reforms? 
The History of Decentralisation in Mozambique
A common distinction in the analysis of decentral-
isation processes is that between devolution and de-
concentration. Whereas devolution refers to the es-
tablishment of autonomous subnational units (e.g. 
cities or federal states headed by directly elected 
local governments), deconcentration merely de-
scribes the downward transfer of responsibili-
ties and budgetary discretion within an otherwise 
centralised state hierarchy. Moreover, while de-
volution is meant to increase the democratic ac-
countability of the local state, deconcentration 
tends to focus on increasing administrative effi-
ciency by reducing the gap between administra-
tive decision-making and the affected population. 
Following independence in 1975, Mozambique 
emerged as a unitary socialist state under Frelimo, 
the former liberation movement. The 1977 Consti-
tution established socialist-style centralisation of 
the state in which line ministries were vertically 
deconcentrated. 
Since the 1994 Constitution came into force Mo-
zambique has embarked on a gradual decentrali-
sation process, albeit one that precludes the possi-
bility of a federal state. In 1998 local elections were 
held for the first time in 33 mainly urban munici-
palities (autarquias). The number of urban munic-
ipalities has since grown to 53. Nonetheless, these 
autonomous municipalities have not replaced ex-
isting districts, which have also increased in num-
ber (from 123 to 150) and continue to be part of the 
centralised state structure. Despite a far-reaching 
constitutional mandate “to promote local devel-
opment,” municipalities’ autonomy remains lim-
ited due to a lack of financial independence and a 
lack of distinction between provincial responsibil-
ities and municipal responsibilities. At the same 
time, a process of territorial deconcentration was 
meant to empower district and provincial admin-
6 According to Tomás Vieira Mário (in Savana weekly newspa-
per, printed edition, Maputo, 19 June 2015) and interviews 
conducted by Natália Bueno with Renamo ex-combatants in 
Maputo, June 2015. 
istration by transferring responsibilities from the 
centre downwards. Currently, districts and mu-
nicipalities overlap in a number of cases – a fact 
that highlights the hybrid character of the Mozam-
bican decentralisation process (Plagemann 2009). 
Since 2009 provincial elections have been held 
parallel to national elections. In contrast to munic-
ipal assemblies, however, provincial assemblies 
have a merely consultative role. Like district ad-
ministrators, provincial governors continue to be 
nominated by the president. This may create fric-
tion in those provinces and districts in which op-
position parties have won majorities. The estab-
lishment of a centrally nominated state repre-
sentative (representante do estado) to moderate be-
tween the district and the municipality in instanc-
es of overlap underlines the state’s unwillingness 
to cede control (Weimar 2012: 99). 
Local elections and, to a lesser extent, provin-
cial elections have in the past shown their poten-
tial to facilitate opposition parties’ efforts to in-
crease their visibility beyond individual munici-
palities and gain access to the state, which has tra-
ditionally been under the tight control of the rul-
ing party. The MDM emerged as a viable opposi-
tion party following their electoral success in two 
rounds of local elections (2008 and 2013/14). Af-
ter Renamo boycotted the 2013 local elections in 
the midst of violent conflict, the MDM competed 
in all 53 municipalities for the first time. Today, 
the party controls four municipalities, including 
three provincial capitals and Mozambique’s sec-
ond- and third-largest cities (Nampula and Beira, 
respectively). Given the MDM’s success – and de-
spite attempts by Frelimo to strengthen its hold 
on the local level – further devolutionary reforms 
have not materialised.
Although decentralisation reforms continued 
throughout the past decade, not least due to sig-
nificant donor pressure and financial support, the 
government’s proclaimed gradual approach has 
so far prevented the existence of truly autonomous 
local governments. Instead, this approach has fa-
cilitated partial recentralisation (Weimer 2012: 
100–101) and has increased complexity of the ad-
ministrative landscape due to its lack of a clear vi-
sion of state structure and intergovernmental re-
lations. This scenario likely reflects disagreements 
not only between the central leadership and for-
eign donors (largely in favour of devolution) but 
also within the ruling party itself.
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Evidence from Comparative Research on 
Territorial Autonomy 
Would granting Renamo increased territorial au-
tonomy be a sustainable solution to tensions in 
Mozambique? Since the end of the Cold War, ter-
ritorial autonomy (e.g. federalism or the estab-
lishment of autonomous provinces) has featured 
as a prominent component of a number of peace 
processes. Such arrangements are typically laid 
out in peace agreements negotiated by the con-
flict parties. Supporters of territorial autonomy 
deals stress that these institutional arrangements 
mitigate fears of exploitation amongst margin-
alised groups, address economic insecurities, in-
crease efficiency in administration, and satisfy lo-
cal demands for cultural sovereignty (Lake and 
Rothchild 2005). Opponents of territorial auton-
omy pacts argue that such deals can create par-
allel structures of authority that further weak-
en war-torn states, reinforce divisive ethnic iden-
tities, and create new instability and secessionist 
demands (Wolff 2009).
As Figure 1 shows, territorial autonomy ar-
rangements have predominated in Europe, where 
they played a key role in peace accords in Koso-
vo and Bosnia. In Africa, however, they have been 
much less frequently employed – featuring in on-
ly 15 peace agreements between 1989 and 2006 
(about 30 per cent) (Zanker et al. 2015). The map 
in Figure 2 plots those African countries in which 
conflict parties signed a peace accord between 
1989 and 2006 (in light blue) and those countries 
in which a peace accord called for territorial au-
tonomy arrangements (in dark blue). These in-
clude recent examples of territorial autonomy 
pacts implemented in Sudan (where enhanced ter-
ritorial autonomy for South Sudan ultimately cul-
minated in its independence in 2011) and Burundi 
Figure 1. Percentage of Peace Agreements with Territorial Autonomy, 1989–2006
Source: Own illustration based on data taken from Ottmann and Vüllers (2014).
 
Figure 2: African Peace Agreements and 
Territorial Autonomy Arrangements, 
1989–2006
 
Source: Own illustration based on data taken from Ott-
mann and Vüllers (2014).
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(following the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000). 
Nonetheless, continued violence in both these cas-
es shows that territorial autonomy arrangements 
are no magic bullet for resolving violent internal 
conflict altogether.
Countries shaded in light blue signed a peace 
agreement. Countries shaded in dark blue signed 
a peace agreement that called for increased terri-
torial autonomy (decentralisation, federalism, or 
autonomous provinces). 
When do territorial autonomy arrangements 
contribute to sustainable peace, and what lessons 
can be learned from comparative research for Mo-
zambique? Generally, the research suggests that 
when fully implemented, territorial autonomy ar-
rangements are amongst the key contributors to 
durable peace. For instance, of 33 autonomy ar-
rangements struck in peace agreements between 
1989 and 2004 across the globe, all 9 deals that 
were fully implemented were followed by lasting 
peace; even those countries where territorial au-
tonomy implementation was only partly achieved 
were more peaceful than countries without au-
tonomy arrangements (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). 
Nevertheless, recent literature stresses that con-
flicts are not automatically more easily resolved 
at the subnational level (Ansorg et al. 2013); on 
its own, territorial autonomy is often an insuffi-
cient long-term solution to internal conflict. The 
evidence shows that in post-conflict societies, ter-
ritorial autonomy is most helpful when combined 
with other conflict resolution instruments, partic-
ularly power-sharing deals at the central govern-
ment level (Cederman et al. 2015, Wolff 2009). 
Prospects for Territorial Power-Sharing in 
Mozambique
Comparative findings suggest that subnational au-
tonomy can – under certain circumstances – be an 
effective tool for consolidating peace. However, 
evidence from other cases also suggest that grow-
ing tensions in Mozambique cannot be resolved by 
simply granting Renamo territorial autonomy; in-
stead, territorial arrangements need to be embed-
ded in broader negotiations and institutions at the 
national level. Earlier this year, Renamo’s poorly 
manufactured legislative initiative demonstrated 
to be wholly inadequate for such an undertaking, 
and, more importantly, Frelimo did not express a 
willingness to engage in the “depoliticisation” of 
the state in earlier rounds of negotiations. 
Nevertheless, pressure to decentralisation has 
been amounting. Venancio Mondlane of the MDM 
recently said, “There is no escape from decentral-
isation and power-sharing in Mozambique, but 
we have our own ideas about it.” He added that 
although the MDM supported decentralisation, 
they saw the revision of electoral legislation and 
of the Constitution as a viable alternative to Ren-
amo’s failed legislative initiative7. For them, such 
reform would be a long-term process. Indeed, a 
credible proposition for provincial autonomy 
would include meaningful provincial elections for 
a body with legislative powers and budgetary au-
thority and elected provincial governors instead 
of centrally appointed ones. This would effective-
ly amount to transforming the unitary Mozambi-
can state into a quasi-federal one. 
Given Frelimo’s control over the decentralisa-
tion process since the 1990s, its hold on national 
unity for ideological and political reasons, and the 
reactions to Dhlakama’s proposition, such a radi-
cal step is extremely unlikely. Consider that on 3 
March 2015 Gilles Cistac, a prominent constitu-
tional lawyer and professor at Eduardo Mondlane 
University in Maputo, was shot dead in broad day-
light. Although the motives remain unclear and the 
assailants have not been identified, there appears 
to be no doubt that this was a political act. After all, 
contrary to Frelimo’s claim that Renamo’s region-
al autonomy proposal was unconstitutional, Cistac 
argued that the Constitution did in fact permit the 
establishment of autonomous provinces despite its 
commitment to Mozambique as a “unitary state.” 
Following his assertion, Cistac was ferociously at-
tacked on social networks. It appeared, as one ob-
server notes, that “Renamo’s demand [has] hit an 
especially sensitive nerve in Frelimo” (Darch 2015: 
2). The most recent armed confrontations – attrib-
uted by some to Frelimos’s radical Guebuza wing 
– only added to the impression that Nyusi’s concil-
iatory tone had reached its limit. 
On 30 November 2015 Renamo parliamentary 
group submitted a partial revision of the Mozam-
bican Constitution as a substitute for the autono-
mous provinces bill shot down by Frelimo in late 
April. According to Renamo, the Constitutional 
revision was meant to establish a greater auton-
7 The interview was conducted by Natália Bueno in Maputo, 
August 2015.
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omy of Mozambican provinces (autarquia provin-
cial) similar to municipal autonomy by, among 
others, calling for provincial assemblies to elect 
provincial governors.8 As a provisional measure, 
the proposed bill ascribed the presidential candi-
date with most votes in the respective provinces 
the right to choose the governor. Frelimo’s parlia-
mentary group in the Commission for Constitu-
tional Affairs, Human Rights and Legality reject-
ed Renamo’s revision. The Commission, howev-
er, recommended the creation of an ad hoc com-
mission to review the Constitution with the inten-
tion to further its decentralisation9. Whereas Fre-
limo’s ambivalent record in decentralisation re-
forms, the governing party’s hold on central pow-
er and the recent radicalization of the political 
conflict suggested little room for compromise over 
Renamo’s demands for autonomous provinces in 
the first place, Nyusi’s recent intervention in slow-
ing down Renamo disarmament may nevertheless 
have opened a new space for dialogue over subna-
tional autonomy as a contribution to sustainable 
peace in Mozambique. 
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